University of Tennessee, Knoxville

TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative
Exchange
Masters Theses

Graduate School

5-2002

An iterative methodology for reliability prediction
Thomas Blake Brinly
University of Tennessee

Follow this and additional works at: https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_gradthes

Recommended Citation
Brinly, Thomas Blake, "An iterative methodology for reliability prediction. " Master's Thesis, University of
Tennessee, 2002.
https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_gradthes/5890

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at TRACE: Tennessee Research and
Creative Exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Masters Theses by an authorized administrator of TRACE:
Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. For more information, please contact trace@utk.edu.

To the Graduate Council:
I am submitting herewith a thesis written by Thomas Blake Brinly entitled "An iterative
methodology for reliability prediction." I have examined the final electronic copy of this thesis for
form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Science, with a major in Industrial Engineering.
Hampton Liggett, Major Professor
We have read this thesis and recommend its acceptance:
Accepted for the Council:
Carolyn R. Hodges
Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School
(Original signatures are on file with official student records.)

To the Graduate Council:
I am submitting herewith a thesis written by Thomas Brinly entitled "An Iterative
Methodology For Reliability Prediction." I have examined the final paper copy of this
thesis for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Master of Science, with a major in Industrial Engineering.

We have read this thesis and
recommend its acceptance:

Acceptance for the Council:

Vice Provost and Dean 0£'
Graduate Studies

An Iterative Methodology For Reliability Prediction

A Thesis
Presented for the
Master of Science
Degree
The University of Tennessee Knoxville

Thomas Brinly
May 2002

Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to my parents, Robert W. and Ann G. Brinly for their never
ending support throughout my entire collegiate career, and my brother, Samuel, for his
support, patience, inspiration, and humor.·

11

Acknowledgements

I wish to thank the entire staff of the Industrial Engineering department for giving
me the tools necessary to complete this endeavor. I thank my entire committee for their
input and support, but most importantly, Dr. Liggett, without who's guidance, input, and
advice this thesis would never have even begun.
I would also like to thank my brother, Samuel, for late night conversations that
helped me see the mistakes I was too close to notic�.
There was a support community of unbelievable proportions that got me through
this, and I cannot begin to thank them all, but to everyone who encouraged and supported
me, in whatever manner, thank you.

111

Abstract·

While much research has focused on the development of reliability prediction
methodologies for the electronics industry, far less work addresses the evaluation of
mechanical rotating equipment. Structured prediction methodologies that consider and
attempt to reduce the resource requirements of reliability prediction do not exist in this
realm. Various prediction techniques to ascertain the failure rates of mechanical
equipment are widely accepted and applied, each having different resource requirements
and each inducing different degrees of uncertainty. A methodology is reported herein to
assist the engineer in performing reliability prediction. This iterative framework utilizes
simulation to evaluate the uncertainty of reliability prediction, and, in each iteration,
identifies the critical components that have the greatest impact on the uncertainty of
predicted reliability for the entire system. Non-critical components are not included in
the more rigorous, and costly, �ubsequent iterations. Thus, the engineer is presented with
a tool by which the resources consumed in reliability prediction may be reduced.
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Chapter I
Introduction
1.0 Introduction

Modem industry runs on equipment. In a perfect world, industry would never be
handicapped by that equipment failing. Since there has yet to be the breakthrough
development that leads to infinite lifetimes for equipment, the equipment will, at some
point, fail. It is the job of the reliability engineer to minimize the frequency and effects
of those failures. In order to do so, the reliability engineer must first predict the failures.
The significance of reliability prediction may be found in the standards of the two
biggest original users of reliability prediction, the American Department of Defense
(DoD) and the British Ministry of Defense (MoD). From United States military
standards and handbooks:
Reliability predict;ion is an essential function in evaluating a design from
concept through development and in controlling changes during
•
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production. Prediction provides a rational basis for design decisions such
as the choice between alternative concepts, choice of part quality levels,·
derating to be applied, use of proven versus state-of-the-art techniques,
and other factors. [13,iii]
"Reliability prediction provides the quantitative baseline needed to assess progress in
reliability engineering. A prediction made of a proposed design may be used in several
ways." [14, 3-1]
The British MoD echoes that sentiment:
_The principal purposes of a reliability prediction are:
1

(a)

to provide an early indication of the system's potential to meet the

reliability requirement before practical data are available on the system in
question [ ...]
(b)

to reveal aspects of the design which require particular attention to

reliability or which present higher risks in relation to the achievement of
the requirement;
(c)

to provide inputs to related project activities such as design

reviews, design evaluation, trade-off studies, life cycle costing, logistics
studies, safety analyses and apportionments. [2, 14-1]
These.handbooks and standards represent some of the most well defined
documentation of reliability procedures available. The fact that they place such a great
importance on the prediction of the system reliability should establish the significance of
that task.
Since the term reliability is often used in non-engineering terms, the
inexperienced reader might have some uncertainty as to its application in the field of
engineering. A common definition of reliability is the probability that a component or
system will perform its intended function for a given set of conditions over. a specified
period of time. It is that probability that most, if not all, decisions regarding the reliability
of a system are based upon. The problem lies in assigning a value to that probability.
The most accurate method would obviously be to test the equipment under identical
operating conditions and use that experience to estimate .the probability of it failing.
While accurate, the resources needed to perform such testing for all components in a
system would quickly become prohibitive. Conversely, ballpark estimates, while
2

inexpensive to obtain, may not provide the engineer with sufficient precision to make a
decision regarding the system.
The probability that equipment will fail is a function of the mean time between
failures (MTBF) of the equipment. This value is the average time between failures of a
repairable component. When dealing with non-repairable components, the appropriate
term is mean time to failure (MTTF). The analysis presented herein will focus solely on
non-repairable systems. As discussed by Kales, when discussing non-repairable systems
where the analysis begins at time equal to 0, MTTF and MTBF may be used
interchangeably. [10] Because of this, when citing other authors, the term MTTF is
used, regardless of the notation in the cited source.
There has been a tremendous amount of effort dedicated to assigning values to the
MTTF in the electronics industry. Reliability prediction itself was born out of the
frequent failures of the electronic tubes used in the manned space program. [6, SP-321]
Less common is the available literature and research regarding the reliability prediction
of mechanical rotating equipment. A combination of the complexity of causes of failure
and the more pressing requirements of electronics in aerospace and military industries
have left the reliability engineer in less developed territory when dealing with the types of
equipment commonly encountered in industrial environments.
The iterative methodology presented herein will aid the engineer not only in
choosing from the commonly accepted component prediction techniques, but will also
provide a manner by which to evaluate the uncertainty induced by the chosen technique.
The procedure will also reduce the number of components requiring resource consuming
analysis in each iteration.
3

1.1 Problem Statement
In order to make a decision based upon probabilistic analysis, a reliability
engineer must obtain an estimate of the reliability of the component, sub-component, or
system. Such estimates would be applied in most prescribed methods for comparing the
reliability of equipment, and also in certain Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM) and
Str�amlined RCM (SRCM) programs. Determining the reliability of the system hinges
on providing numerical values for the MTTFs for the components and sub-components.
While there are methods to generate valu·es for MTTFs, most procedures outline
the use of the same method for every component in the system. While this is certain to
ensure that all of the resulting predictions are thoroughly performed, these approaches
require that each prediction be treated as equally important to the overall system
reliability prediction. It would therefore be useful for an iterative algorithm to exist that
would assist the engineer in selecting prediction methods and evaluating the uncertainty
resulting from those selections in such a manner as to reduce required resources needed
to perform the prediction phase of any reliability project.
1.2 Scope of Work
Since there are a number of established predictions methods, it would not be
beneficial to attempt to duplicate that work. Instead, the current methods will be
analyzed, and grouped into generic classifications for use in an iterative method. The
strengths and weaknesses of the generic groups will be identified from literature and be
used to develop a sequence of methods that will encompass the need for highly precise
prediction, highly expedient prediction, or a combination of the two. Highly precise
·,
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predictions consume more resources, while highly expedient predictions are faster and
cheaper, but typically result in much lower certainty.
In order to reduce the resources required for prediction, each iteration will require
a method not only to determine the system reliability and its variance compared to a
baseline, but also to identify the components whose predictions have the greatest impact
on the system uncertainty. The analysis of the system reliability will be made using
Monte Carlo simulation to choose values based upon the distributions of each
component's prediction and inserting those values into the equation for system reliability.
The impact of each component's prediction on the system reliability will be identified
through sensitivity analysis.
This approach relies on two key prerequisites. The first, that a Failure Modes
Effects Analysis (FMEA) has been performed to identify the components needing
analysis. The second is that the engineer has identified both a minimum value (the lower
limit) for the system reliability and a probability that the system's reliability will not fall
below that lower limit.
The distributions used in this approach are those most commonly associated with
the process industries. The primary focus of this methodology will deal with rotating
equipment, although methods designed for electronics and static structures will not be
excluded. This type of equipment has frequent industrial applications, and is less
frequently discussed in literature.

5

1.3 Anticipated Results

In order to minimize the number of components that require resource-consuming
analysis, an iterative scheme will be developed whereby each component will be first
evaluated by a simple, inexpensive method. Unless it is possibly to obtain significant
historical data without commitment of resources, the predictions garnered .from this
phase will most likely contain a great deal of uncertainty. The system reliability will be
evaluated, compared to some established baseline, and the predictions of those
components whose variance has a lesser effect on the· system reliability will be deemed
acceptable. Those components whose variance have a greater effect on the system
reliability wiU require more rigorous, resource consuming prediction methods.
1.4 Organization

Appendix A 1 will provide readers who are unfamiliar with the concepts of
reliability engineering with a short review of the fundamentals utilized in the remainder
of the work. The second chapter will review the history of reliability prediction, evaluate
currently accepted methods of prediction, and more specifically discuss the details of the
problems identified in the problem statement. The iterative methodology developed to
choose and evaluate prediction methods will be outlined in the third chapter. A sample
problem will be solved in chapter 4 to provide insight into the use of the different
prediction methods recommended. The conclusions reached, as well as a discussion of
the limitations of the methodology and the potential for future work, will be presented in
the fifth chapter.
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Chapter II
Literature Review
2.1 History
Reliability prediction first became an area of interest as a result of post World
War II technologies. While developing manned flight programs, the notoriously
unreliable electronic tub�s began to draw attention. Various studies and groups were
commissioned to investigate this problem, and as a result, the Advisory Group on
Reliability ofElectronic Equipment (AGREE) was formed in the 1950s. [6] AGREE
was to identify actions that would result in more reliable electronic equipment. It was
during this time that reliability engineering as a discipline was conceived.
The 1950s would produce some significant steps in reliability engineering, as
efforts were focused on improving the reliability of components through both design and
testing. The first dedicated reliability programs were established, and statistical analyses
were incorporated into reliability predictions. RCA's TR- 1 100, "Reliability Stress
Analysis for Electronic Equipment," published in 1956 propagated the use of
mathematical models in reliability prediction. [6] The first symposiums on reliability
prediction were held during these times.
The 1960s would see a virtual explosion of research and publication in the area of
reliability prediction. One of the most significant documents in reliability prediction,
Military Handbook 2 17 "Reliability Prediction ofElectronic Equipment" (MH-2 17), was
first released in 1962 by the US Navy. MH-2 17 quickly eclipsed all other standards,
partly due to its inclusiveness, and partly due to the defense contractors' forced adherence
7

to the standard. Also in 1962, the first symposium on physics of failure was held in
Rome. The sponsoring agencies, Rome Air Development Center (RADC) and ITT
Research Institute (IITRI) would both have major reliability prediction roles in the future.
It was during this time period that two distinct groups of reliability engineers evolved,
with th� physics-of-failure engineers and scientists progressing towards improving
equipment reliability, and the systems engineers predicting, testing, and specifying
equipment reliability. [6]
In the 1970s, RADC took responsibility for the upkeep of:MH-2 17, and in 1974
released the first revision (MH-2 l 7B). Many fundamentally sound models for reliability
-prediction were developed at this time, but were rejected by the users as being to
cumbersome. Physics-of-failure suffered the same fate, requiring information that was
simply not available to typical users, and as a consequence were left out of:MH-217.
Systems at this point were relatively simple, and the individual components were the
primary focus. [6]
Integrated circuit (IC) technology forever changed reliability prediction in the
1980s. Industries began to develop their own models for more specific applications, with
the automotive and telecommunications industries diverging from:MH-2 17. :MH-2 17
itself was updated frequently, the last occurrence being 199 1 when:MH-2 17F was
released. ICs provided much more complex systems, and suddenly the individual
components were no longer the limiting factor. The traditional approach of collecting
field data and quantifying model factors based upon statistical analyses was no longer
feasible. Up until this point, the standard measure of complexity had been the number of
gates or transistors used. [6]
8

Since no preference had been established for either physics of failure or
empirically based models, the debate rages on. The premises of lower system
complexity that earlier models depended upon were no longer viable, and system
wide factors now dominate predictions. [7]
2.2 Current Methods

Ministry of Defense (MoD) DEF STAN 0041/3 identifies the preferred
methods of reliability prediction: similar equipment method, extrapolation
method, and generic parts method. While other prediction methods exist, their
lack of common acceptance and use throughout industry has not yet warranted
their inclusion here. [2] Conspicuously absent is a technique known as physic
of-failure. While a popular and effective technique in the electronics industry,
publications regarding the application of this technique to mechanical rotating
equipment are nonexistent.
2.2.1

Similar Equipment Method

The most accurate data for prediction is based upon similar equipment
operating under similar conditions. Often this data is available in-house, and
therefore comes with less uncertainty due to variance in operating conditions, but
is based upon fewer failures, and therefore less statistically certain. [2] When
comparing equipment to determine if similarity exists, the design similarities,
manufacturing similarities, and operational environment and load similarities are
taken into account. When dealing with equipment whose design is based upon
older, but still similar equipment, the small differences can be isolated and
evaluated for effect on the.equipment's anticipated reliability. [15]
9

2.2.2 Extrapolation of Tests and Trials
Reliability estimations can be inferred from specific testing ofequipment. These
tests should mimic as closely as possible actually design details, duty cycle, operating
environment, failure definition, and other operating conditions. Data gleaned from this
method should be handled with due diligence because ofthe inherent uncertainties
induced when extrapolating data outside oftest conditions. [2]
2.2.3 Generic Parts Method
The generic parts method relies on the principle that the reliability ofa component
can be estimated through a base failu�e rate multiplied by various factors to account for
operating conditions. This method allows for a quick and easily applied analysis ofany
system in which the equipment configurations are known, and interdependence is low.
Since this method is the least self-explanatory, there has been a greater amount of
publication concerning it than the other two methods. The widely accepted US l\1IL
HDBK-2 l 7F provides such a process for electronic equipment. The initial efforts in this
area for non-electronic equipment were spearheaded by US Rome Air Development
Center, although sources can now be found in a wide variety ofindustrial and military
publications. [2]
The Institute ofMechanical Engineer's Guides for the Process Industries
publjcation The Reliability ofMechanical Systems offers a clear review ofthe use of
generic parts method and its subsequent data sources for non-electronic equipment. [5]
Generic parts count reliability prediction relies upon the premise that the overall
reliability ofthe system is a function ofthe number ofcomponents in the system and the
reliability ofthose components. The failure rates for many such components can be
10

found in published databases. IMechE summarized 22 such databases, 19 of which
provide data for rotating equipment. [5] The summaries are included in Appendix A.2.
Obviously, the accuracy of any prediction is related to the quality of the data it is based
upon. Since very few mechanical components are identical, there will be many cases
· when "closest fit" data or anecdotal estimation must be used to obtain values for the
reliability of components. Other sources of data are from the manufacturer or historical
data from similar applications. [ 5]
The general form of the models is

where AXA is the predicted failure rate for equipment X in failure mode A, � is the
overall Failure Rate for equipment types similar to X, Ki is the stress factor for stress I,
and p(A) is the proportion of failures in modes A
A simplified model for global reliability

where K1 represents the stress factor for the overall environment and K2 is the K2 is the
stress factor based on the component nominal rating stress. Tables 1 and 2 [5] show
recommended values for K1 and K2. Where sample data is available, confidence limits
can be set. Bloch and Geitner also provide a method of predicting the reliability of
turbomachinery, then, more specifically centrifugal pumps. This method is an example
of the use of publicly available data and modification of it by the application of factors.
For turbomachinery, a series of reliability factors are used. These factors include: type
of equipment, equipment size, number of bearings in train, start-up time, maximum
pressures, maximum temperature, coupling, coupling support, starting frequency, piping
11

Table 1: Environmental stress factors (1(1}
General Environmental Conditions
Ideal, static conditions
Vibration free, controlled envirorurent
General-purpose, grmmd-based
Ship, sheltered
Ship, exposed
Road
Rail
Air
Missile

0. 1
0.5
1
1.5
2
3
4
10
100

· Table 2: Rating Stress Factors (1(2}
Percentage of
component nominal
rating
K2
140
4
2
120
1
100
80
0.6
60
0.3
40
0.2
20
0. 1
strains, pipe supports, expansion joints, foundation rigidity, vibration, vibration
insulation, operators, maintenance personnel, and maintenance facilities. When the
values are assigned based upon experience and industrial knowledge, the sum result can
be compared with that of another piece of machinery to determine the best choice. [ 1]
For centrifugal pumps, three factors are identified: speed (in RPM), impeller
diameter, and flow rate. The reliability index is the product of these three and may be
used to compare different pump options. [ 1]
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2.3 Comparison and Evaluation of Methods
The similar equipment method cannot be used for equipment being placed in a
new environment, or new equipment. Additionally, smaller companies are less likely to
have this data available, and thus more likely to develop a habit ofusing generic parts
count methods. However, the proliferation ofsources ofreliability data increase the
likelihood offinding data based upon similar equipment. DEF STAN 00-4 1/3 and MIL
STD-756B identify this method as preferred whenever possible.
While trials and tests can provide an insight into equipment behavior under
conditions similar to the operating environment, there are two key drawbacks. Any tests
require extrapolation to the operating environment, inducing uncertainty. More
significantly, the cost ofperforming these tests in a manner to reduce that uncertainty can
be prohibitive. The financial costs are merely a portion ofthe resource consumed, as
industrial equipments' typical longevity requires a testing time much longer than the time
frame generally given for the p�ediction phase ofa project. Because ofthis, tests and
trials are the method oflast resort, typically only applied in systems whose consequences
�ffailure, be they monetary, safety or environmental; or system which have little
historical reference.
The generic parts count method is an efficient bypass ofexpensive tests, but
induces an unwelcome uncertainty into the prediction. Data should be found that requires
the fewest and most certain multipliers. Such data will be encountered in situation where
the equipment was not similar enough for the application ofthe similar equipment
method. Since this method does provide information without the commitment require� in
the testing method, it can be used in situations where variability is not such a high
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concern. Because there is inherent variability in the use of the generic parts count
method, some type of sensitivity analysis must be performed before accepting the system
reliability results.

2.4 Prediction Organization Methods
The military sources give some help in organizing the system prediction. DEF
STAN 00-4 1/3 gives a list of the preferential order of the three groups of prediction
techniques, but states that a typical equipment prediction will employ data from all three.
[2] The US military standard for reliability prediction only specifies the use of the
similar equipment method and generic parts count method, although the use of the similar
equipment method is preferred. [ 1 5]
While the MoD document mentions the presence of uncertainties resulting from
the prediction methods, no manner by which to analyze the uncertainty is offered. The
DoD document procedure·completely ignores the uncertainties induced by the prediction
techniques it identifies. Additionally, neither of the procedures laid out by the MoD or
DoD takes into account that the prediction of some components will be more important
than others. Because of this, all components will be treated equally, consuming resources
that could be diverted elsewhere.
Coit addresses some of the issues of importance in System Reliability Prediction

Prioritization Strategy. Company-specific field data, accelerated life test results, physics
of failure models, publicly available data and empirical models are identified as potential
sources of component reliability predictions. Company-specific field data, while the
most similar to actual operating conditions, often suffers because of a low number of
failures, resulting in a high statistical uncertainty. Accelerated life testing requires

14

extrapolation from test conditions to the operational environment, inducing both
statistical and additional uncertainty. Publicly available data has a low degree of
statistical uncertainty because of the high number of failures the estimates are based
upon, but a high degree of uncertainty resulting from th� lack of knowledge of
operational and environmental conditions. Empirical methods (which predict a constant
failure rate) and physics-of-failure models (which produce time-dependant failure rates)
induce uncertainty due to the fundamental differences in the models. [4]
System prediction as an iterative scheme is discussed, as well as prioritization of
prediction activities. The preliminary prediction is• performed using previous data or
other mechanisms, and as more detailed information evolves, components predictions are
updated or replaced. When this method is employed, there will .be instances where the
uncertainty associated with component predictions will have a negligible effect on the
overall system reliability prediction. This is often exhibited in redundant configurations.
In these cases, no further resources need to be expended to estimate the component
predictions. Conversely, when the uncertainty associated with the component predictions
has a large effect on the overall system reliability, more analysis must be performed. [4]
The Reliability Prediction Prioritization Index is introduced as a function of the
variance of the component's prediction and the corresponding effect on the system's
prediction. This is calculated for every component in the system. Using Pareto Analysis,
the indices are ranked to determine a group by which the largest benefit can be made by
the smallest assignment of resources. There are four cases where the ranking is
overridden. These are

15

1 . Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) classifies the component
in the highest (most severe) class.
2. Component technology is unproven and has yet to be demonstrated in
fielded systems.
3. Component is in a redundant configuration and the effect of common
cause failures is believed to be significant.
4. Other system or operational specific condition dictates more detailed
·analysis independent of the RPPI index. [4]
As mentioned previously, the use of pooled data induces uncertainty into the
prediction. When pulling ·data for a component from N sources variance may be
calculated as follow:

A

A

where A.; is the ith empirical estimate of the failure rate, l is the pooled estimate of the
failure rate, and ni is the number of failures in the ith estimate of the failure rate. [ 4]
The concept of an iterative process reduces unnecessary commitment of resources
to perform needless reliability prediction. The idea that a simple technique can be
employed first and only those components needing further analysis identified leads to a
more appropriate application of resources in reliability prediction. Unfortunately, the
calculation of the RPPI can itself be cumbersome, requiring partial derivatives of the
system reliability as a function of each component. This method also lacks a mechanism
to incorporate the variance if provided by an individual source. The component
16

prediction variance is calculated based upon the given failure rates, with the uncertainty
coming from the different rates for the sources, with no acknowledgment of the variance
each of those sources brings.
Coit introduces a method to determine confidence intervals for complex systems
when using estimated component reliability. The method, System Reliability Confidence
Intervals (SRCI), is a three-step approach. First, the variances of the components are
estimated, the system variance is calculated, and the system reliability CI is calculated
based upon a lognormal distribution for the system reliability. [3]
SRCI applies only to systems of active redundancy, with a lognormal distribution
for the system reliability, and component independence. Those assumptions limit the
applicability to a specific set of systems, and therefore cannot be used for all cases.
A potential solution to the complexity of statistical calculation is the use of Monte
Carlo simulation. Orman, Cassady, and Greenwood outline a method for using
simulation to generate a model to evaluate the conceptual design of a proposed system.
While this is not an entirely new concept, most previous approaches have been generated
for a specific system. The approach presented, however, is a general simulation model.
Without knowing the specific failure rates for the individual components, mission
reliability, average time to failure and average mission cost can be estimated for the
system. [ 13]
The model relies on the number of components in active and/or inactive
redundancy, the known failure rate or failure rate probability distribution, the acquisition
cost of the component, the length of the mission (required life cycle), and the cost of
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mission failure. Over a set of replications, the expected reliability, the MTTF, and the
cost of operation are estimated. The confidence interval can also be established.
Gedam and Beaudet provide a more detailed description of the use of Monte
Carlo Simulation. In this approach, the block diagram is transformed into a table in an
Excel� spreadsheet. After proving the randomness of the Excel random number
generator, exponential, Wiebull, normal, uniform, and lognormal distributions were
employed to simulate system reliability. An expression is provided to calculate the
confidence intervals based upon the number of simulations. Further improvement can be
made by instructing Excel to display Probability Density Functions (PDFs) and
Cumulative Pistribution Functions (CDFs). [9]
The use of simulation provides a method to estimate. system reliability and
uncertainty without complex statistical calculations. However,' the methods used to
introduce the failure rates into the simulation are not faultless. Orman uses an optimistic,
pessimistic, and most likely technique to derive an equation for the values of TTF to be
pulled from. It may not be possible for a set of data sources to be combined into those
three points smoothly. Gedam and Beaudet use provided mean and variance values for
each component. As in the case with RPPI, those values may not always be possible to
calculate.
Table 3 summarizes the characteristics of the organizational methods discussed.
If some of the components of the methods were combined, a methodology could be
developed that would avoid some of the weaknesses. By following such a methodology,
the reliability engineer could perform the system prediction in a manner whereby the
resources required would be less than by using any of the methods described.
18
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DFF STAN 0041/3
MIL-SID-756B
RPPI
SRQ
Sim.Jlation

SwmmyofOrganizational :Methods
UncertaintyAnalysis Reduces Resources Identifies techniques

Table 3:

N
N
N
y
y

N
N
y
N
N
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Chapter III
Methodology
3.0 Prediction Methods
Borrowing the concept of iteration from the RPPI strategy [3 ], an iterative method
is proposed. It will consist of three-phases, each requiring a significant increase in the
committal of resources. The First Phase utilizes little expenditure of resources, and is
more based upon educated estimates than numerical histories. The Second Phase uses the
available historical data. The Third Phase requires life cycle testing under similar
operating conditions. Figure 1 provides an overview of the methodology.

Figure 1 . Overview of Methodology

21

During each phase, Monte Carlo simulation will be used to generate values for the
MTTF . These values will be used to calculate the component and system reliability. The
results of each iteration will be compared to a set lower reliability limit and the total
number below the limit will be tallied . By dividing by the number of iterations
performed, the probability of the system reliability falling below the given limit can be
calculated . If that probability is too high (hence the prediction is unacceptable), more
detailed predictions must be applied. If the system is deemed acceptable, the analysis
may be stopped . This diffe�s from the previously discussed techniques in that only the
lower limit of reliability is a matter for concern. Before the next phase, the sensitivity of
each component and sub-component will be calculated to assist in determining which
component ' s predictions contribute the most to the system reliability prediction' s
uncertainty. Those components whose variance does not affect the system significantly
can be accepted in their current state, and the values for those predictions carried into the
next phase . Re-prediction, a cycling technique, permits those components to be re
analyzed if the uncertainty resulting from their prediction becomes significant in
subsequent phases .
There are some preliminary steps that must be taken before the evaluation may
begin . �hese steps are outlined in Figure 2 . The· first step is to perform an FMEA on the
system, as described by either the governing documents for the i_ndustry, or any
commonly accepted technique . A block diagram is then composed for the system, and
from this block diagram, the equation for the reliability of the system as a .function of the
component reliability is developed . The engineer must then establish a lower acceptable
reliability limit, R£ . Unless the lower limit is set well below the system ' s performance
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capabilities, the imprecisions of reliability prediction will ·induce a probability that the
system's reliability is actually below that lower limit. The engineer must therefore
determine the acceptable probability for this event, 0:

where R. represents the calculated reliability of the system.
3.1 First Phase
The First Phase predictions should be made with either readily available data,
such as in-house histories or manufacturer's reports or the PERT 0-M-P technique. [1 1 ]
Obviously, if information yielding a more precise distribution is present, the 0-M-P
technique should not be applied for that component and a distribution based on historical
data used in its place. The steps required in the First Phase can be seen in Figure 3.

3.0. 1 . 1
Set up Block Diagram
of System

3.0. 1 .2
Set up Equation for
System Reliability

3.0. 1 .4
Establish
P { relSys<LowerLimit}
Figure 2. Preliminary Steps

3.0. l.3
Establish Lower
Reliability Limit

Component

�-------"------ MITF
3. 1 . 1
Generate Beta Distributions
For MTIFs from O-M-P

3 . 1 .2
First Phase
Simulation

Simulation
Rcsulta
Sensitivity an,----�----.
Uncertainty
• • •
esults

3 } 2}
First Phase
Evaluation

Identify Component.
Requiring Further
Analysia
Componc:nla
Requiring No
Further
Analysia

Distributiona ,--------"---.

Componc:nta
Requiring
Further
Analysia

Aocept System

Figure 3 . First Phase
3.1.1

O-M-P Estimation and Generation of Beta Distributions
'

The o�M-P technique involves estimating the most likely MTTF, M, the
optimistic value ofMTTF (whereby 95% would be below this value), 0, and the
pessimistic value ofMTJ'F (whereby 95% would be above this value), P. After
estimating the times, a beta function can be calculated. The mean time to failure would
be [ 1 1]:
µ=

P + 4M + O =
M1TF
6

The variance is [ 1 1] :
0-P
u 2 = -3 .2
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The alpha values are defined as
a1

_ (µ - PX2M - P - O)
) and a2 _- (0
(µ - µ))
(M v
- µ,.p - P
-P

Sample calculations for these are available i n Chapter 4 . These values allow the beta
distribution to be determined, and then related to back to the MTTF. This allows for easy
transition into Monte Carlo simulation, as most software packages can generate beta
values based upon the two alpha values._ [ 14] Since the O-M-P estimation will be very
broad, Figure 4 shows the circumstances when O-M-P is preferred.
New Component

Use: Similar Equipnenl
Historical Data
(Second Rlasc:)

Yes

Usc: O-M-P
Estimation
. (First Phase:)

Use: Generic Parts Method
(Second Rlasc:)

Must perform tests
(Third Rlasc:)

Figure 4. Decision Tree for Initial Data Source Selection
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O-M-P estimation is only used when it is possible to develop credible estimates at a
lower cost than would be incurred through the use of historical data as outlined in the
Second Phase. Since there is no way to generate the O-M-P estimation without some
previous experience with the component, a case where no historical data exists will force
the immediate use of tests and trials.
3.1.2

First Phase Simulation
Monte Carlo simulation is used to generate values of the MTTF from the beta

distribution. In each iteration of the simulation, the values for MTTF generated for every
component are used to calculate the components' reliability. The values for the
component are used to calculate the system reliability, which is then compared to the
lower limit. The total number of instances where the system reliability falls below the
lower limit are tallied. MATLAB was used to perform all of the simulation, and the
· sample codes may be found in Appendix A.3.
3.1.1.2 First Phase Evaluation
If the number of tallied instances from above divided by the number iterations
results in a probability below the one established in step 3.0. 1.4, then the further analysis
will be needed. Sensitivity analysis, which is discussed in depth in Section 3 .4, will
allow the engineer to discover which component's prediction have the greatest effect on
the system·uncertainty. These components will require analysis in the Second Phase,
while those components whose predictions have relatively minor effects on the system
reliability prediction's uncertainty will be left as is. Predictions that are not expected to
improve with further analysis will also be taken as is. If however, the probability that the
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system reliability is above the set lower limit is greater than the value specified in step
3 .0. 1 .4, the system is acceptable, and no further steps are necessary.
3.2 Second Phase

Any component whose initial predictions affected the system reliability in such a
manner as to cause an unacceptable probability of being below an acceptable level must
be considered for further study. As noted in the military documents, historical data from
similar equipment is preferred, however, since the variability will be calculated, the use
of the Generic Parts Method is acceptable if needed. Components requiring the
application of the Generic Parts Method will be more likely to require further analysis, as
the v�iance will be higher. The Second Phase is borrows the recommended prediction
techniques from DEF STAN 00-4 1/3 and MIL-HDBK-756B.
Since data from pooled sources can c9me in a few different forms, diligent care
must be applied in the application of this data. Recalling that many sources of pooled ·
data reflect d�fferent operating conditions, the environmental factors supplied by the
generic parts count method or the particular source must be applied to each individual
data source before the pooled reliability is estimated. Because of the variety of levels of
information provided, there is no simple manner by which to combine data from different
sources and still provide an accurate reflection of the variance of all sources. Therefore,
the values for MTTF will be provided from all of the sources. In each iteration of the
simulation, a source will be selected using a source identifier, and then the value of the
MTTF will be selected from that source using Monte Carlo. Figure 5 shows graphically
the steps involved in Second Phase.
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Figure 5 . Second Phase

3.2.1 Generation of Lognormal Distributions

Data sources will provide either: the failure rate, the failure rate and the variance,
or the failure rate and the 90% confidence intervals. Since most sources give no
indication as to the distribution of the estimates, the studies of Moss are relied upon to
estimate the distribution. Moss notes that for a majority of process industry equipment
(including rotating equipment), the distribution of the estimated MTTF is lognormal.
[12] Since the lognormal distribution requires only a mean and a standard deviation,
those cases where the variance and the mean are given, no further manipulation of the
data is required to set up the simulation. For cases where numerical limits are supplied in
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lieu of the variance, the worst case variance may be calculated using Chebychev' s
inequality,

1
P{lx - µI � ka} � -2
k
where -;.. is the confidence interval. For the common 90% confidence interval, k is
k
1.05409. Information from sources whose only information is number of failures and mean will be treated as described in RPPI. Recalling that a weighted average is used to
calculate the mean, the equation for the variance is [3]:

The data for this component may now be fit .as a lognormal distribution for the
simulation. The provided distribution will be used for the simulation.
3.2.2 Second Phase Simulation

t

As stated, the random s�lection of the source will be based upon a weighted
method. The weight of each source on the can be determined as n.j

n; : where n1

represents the number of failures comprising source i, -and N represents the number of
sources used. The weights are then set up on a cumulative scale such that the probability
of selecting a source will be a function of the range of its weight. When a random
number is generated form a uniform [0, 1] distribution, the number will fall within a
range, and the source for that iteration will be identified . A sample of this is shown in
Section 4.2. 1. Because the simulation in the Second Phase is more complex, a graphical
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representation is given in Figure 6. As shown, the simulation must generate two
variables for each component. The first, the source identifier, will be a uniform
distribution between O and 1. This will be compared to the sequence of the source
weights and a source will be chosen. The second variable will be generated from a
distribution matching the distribution of that source, and used to generate the MTTF.
Once the component MTTF has been determined, the simulation proceeds as it did in the
First Phase. Note that the predictions that were left as is in Phase 1 are handled
identically as the Phase 1 simulation (step 3. 1.2).

J

Use U(O, 1 to Select
Data Source

For Each

Component

For Each
Generate MITF Value Component
From Beta Distribution

Data source
Calculate Component

Reliability

Calculate Component

Reliability

Calculate System

Reliability

Next
Iteration

. Figure 6. Second Phase Simulation
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3.2.2.1 Second Phase Evaluation
The evaluation is similar to the one performed in step 3 . 1 .2. The probability that
the system reliability is below the set value is compared to the probability from step
3 .0. 1.4. In the event that a prediction left as is in Phase 1 is now the highest source of
variance, that component becomes a candidate for re-prediction, and historical data will
be used to generate a MTTF distribution. If the prediction from Phase One has a
possibility to improve, the prediction is now performed using Second Phase techniques,
and the Phase Two simulation is performed again with the new data. When considering a
component for Phase Three, the expectation of a prediction improving is more crucial. If
the hi �torical data was taken fro� a number of reputable sources and based upon
conditions similar to the operating conditions the current system is under, there is a lower
probability that the prediction will improve through tests and trials. If this is the case,
regardless of the variance induced into the system reliability prediction by that
component's prediction, that prediction should be taken as is. Replication of tests already
performed is costly, and if it does not improve the prediction, it is not a worthwhile cost
to incur. If the historical data is based upon dissimilar operating conditions or based
upon a small number of failures, there is a much better chance for improvement in the
Third Phase.

3.3 Third Phase
The Third Phase utilizes testing under similar to operating conditions. As shown
in Figure 7, the procedure is otherwise similar to the other two phases. The data resulting
from similar condition testing must be fit to a function for use in simulation.
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Figure 7. Third Phase
While it may be tempting to use a weighted approach as in the Second Phase,
doing so assumes that the upper and lower limits represent the extreme limits of the mean
•

!

time to failure, a highly unlikely scenario in any limited test. Steps 3.3.2 and 3.3.2. 1 are
similar to the corresponding steps in Phases I and 2. Step 3.3 .3 is the significant
differe�ce.
3.3.3 Acceptance or Rejection of System

If the system does not meet the requirements laid out in steps 3.0. 1.3 and 3.0. 1.4,
the system will be rejected in its·current configuration. The system' s reliability
performance may be improved by either adding components in redundancy, or by
replacing certain components with more reliable ones. The sensitivity and variance
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analysis will have identified the "bad actors," those components who have the most
detrimental effect on the system reliability.
3.4 Sensitivity Calculations

From Coit, the sensitivity of a subcomponent is the partial derivative of the
system with respect to the subcomponent. (COIT) For a single component (R x):

For a sub-component in a k-out-of-n parallel configuration (R xy), the component
sensitivity must first be calculated, and then the effect of each sub-component will be
calculated. Care must be taken when identical components are installed in parallel. Any
variation will be multiplied due to the reoccurrence of that component or sub-component
in the system.
In order to calculate the actual values for the sensitivity, the means and variance s
must be established. The 0-M-P method allows for easy calculation of these. The
Second and Third Phase Methods req�ire a more complex calculation. Since the sources
are often based upon varying numbers of failure, the mean can be calculated using the
weighted average as follows:

The variance will be estimated by simulation. The variance of each component's
estimation will be calculated as follows :
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J=I
u 2 = -----J-1

where j is the current iteration, J is the number of iterations, and MTTF'j is the MTTF for
the current iteration. Sample calculati�ns for these procedures are provided in Chapter 4.
By multiplying each component's sensitivity and variance, the effect of variance
on the overall system reliability can be identified. Those components whose variance has
little effect on the system reliability would be good candidates to ignore in the next phase.
· Also of interest would be the maximum and minimum values of system reliability
that a fluctuation in any sub-component could produce. By substituting I (maximum
reliability) and O (minimum reliability) for the sub-component reliability and
· recalculating the system reliability for each subcomponent, the maximum and minimum
system reliability can be calculated. Those components or subcomponents whose
reliability could drop all the way to zero or increase to one and not have a significant
effect on the system reliability would

qe good candidates to ignore for future prediction

techniques. This may be ignored for systems whose components may be modeled in
series, as the results are evident without additional calculations.
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Chapter IV
Sample Analysis
4.0 Introduction

A hypothetical sample system for consideration is presented in Figure 8. The system
consists of 7 components. Component 1 is a single component. Component 2 is a system
of 4 identical sub-components in standby redundant configuration, 2 of which must
function for the component to function. Component 3 is a system of 2 non-identical sub
components in active redundancy, one of which is required to function for the component
to function. The lower limit for reliability is determined to be 91.5% for 1000 hours of
Component 2
2-out-of-4

-

- Component

Component

-

Component

-

21

22

........

I

Component 3
l-out-of-2

-

....,_

...

Component

23

.__

-

I

Component

24

Figure 8. Sample System
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Component

31

Component
32
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operation. The probability of the system reliability being above this value must be 9 1 . 5%
or above.
The reliability of component 2 is given from Kales where, for a 2-out-of-4
system, the system MTTF is equal to thirteen twelfths of the failure rate of the identical
components. (R2= 13R21/12= 1 3R22'12= 13/R23'12) [ 1 0]. Using the same reference for
component 3, the MTTF is:

where 11.x represents the failure rate of component x. The reliability of component three is
-t

then R3 = e J.IT!I'' . Components 1, 2 and 3 are in series, and the reliability of the system
can then be defined as

The information regarding this hypothetical system was generated to both
realistically simulate data that would have resulted from inquires into the sources
mentioned, and to demonstrate the methodology for handling the different types of data
expected to be encountered the prediction of a mechanical system. Since there are so few
components in the system, there is a low chance of obtaining the range of data types
necessary to demonstrate the handling of all of the common ones.

4.1 First Phase Analysis
The First Phase estimates shown in Table 4 are developed using the O-M-P
method. The estimates for component 3 1 are based upon a long history at the facility,
and are taken as very accurate. Components 1,2, and 3 2 are new to this operating
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Table 4:Data Generated for The First Pass
Optimistic Most Likely Pessimistic Mean
34000
24000
1 8 000 24666.67
MTTF1
MTTF2

36000

1 9000

12000 20666.67

MTTF31

32000

2 1 000

14000 21666.67

MTTF32

34500

27000

17500 .26666.67

enviro�ent, but 3 1 and 32 have been in operation in other somewhat similar conditions
before.
The mean for component one is calculated as:
A

=

O + 4M + P
6

=

34000 + 4 * 24 000 + 1 8 000
6

=

14 8 000
6

=

24666 _ 6667

Using the failure rates as the inverse of the MTTFs for components 3 1 and 32, the failure
rates are:
�.

=

1

1

--- = --� l f 2 1 666.67

�2

1
1
= MITF32 = 26666.61

Substituting the values for A-31 and A-32 into the equation for the MTTF of component 3 :

M'ITF3 = 36379.2
The system reliability using the means is
-1000
-

R.... = e 24661

-1000
-

* e 20661 * e
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-1000
-36l79 .2

= 0 . 8 90 1

4.1.1 Simulation
The system reliability was calculated using 1 00,000 iterations ofMonte Carlo
simulation. The system reliability for each iteration was compared against the
established lower limit, and the percentage ofthose values falling below th� lo�er limit
was noted. In order to perform the simulation, the alpha variables for the beta function
must be calculated, as demonstrated by these calculations for component 1 :
a =
1

(µ. - PX,lM - P - 0) = (24667 - 1 8000X2 * 24000 - 1 8000 - 34000) = 2 5
(M - µ. XO - P)

(24000 - 24667X34000 - 1 8000)

.

a = (O - µi ) a = (34000 - 2466 7 ) •
=
1 . 333 3 . 5
1
2
(24667 - 1 8000)
(ul - P)

The variance· is

V=

(0 - p

2

2

= 34000 - 1 8000 = 25 000 000
(
)
)
'
'
3 .2
3 .2

The simulation was performed in MATLAB using the code found in Appendix A3.
After 1 00,000 iterations, there was a 3 ?. 5 1% chance that the system reliability would be
below the established lower limit of.9 1 5 .
4.1.2 Sensitivity Analysis
As shown in Chapter 3, the partial derivative ofeach component is 1. This
signifies that whatever percent change occurs in any component, the system reliability
will change identically. The partial derivative for subcomponents 3 1 and 32 are not so
simply calculated. Therefore, the indirect analysis method was used. The value ofthe
first component's mean MTTF was changed by 25%, and the reliability recalculated.
The percentage change was multiplied by the prediction's variance to give the weighted
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variance. The value for the mean MTTF was reset, and the same procedure was repeated
for all four predictions. The prediction causing the most variance in .the system was
component 2 (weighted variance =547000), followed by component 1 (203530).
Components 31 (84990) and 32 (101900) contributed less to the system variance. These
values give an indication as to the respective contribution of their prediction's variance
into the uncertainty of the system reliability prediction. Using these, the predictions for
components 31 and 32 will be left as is.
4.2 Second Phase Analysis ·

· · · Data for components 1 and 2 were generated to represent possible values from the
source mentioned in Chapter 2, and are shown in Table 5. Recalling that the MTTF is the
inverse of the failure rate, the failure rates can be converted into MITFs easily. In order
to preserve uniformity of the analysis, the failure rates have already been converted into
MTTFs. The data for component 2 is typical of what would be found in IEEE 500 and
CCPS. Data for component 1 is typical of results from ENI and RADC. Variance in the
form A% +/- YYY.Y indicates that with A% confidence, the MTTF will be within the
given mean plus or minus the YYY.Y. Recalling that the MTTF is the inverse of the
Table 5: Historical Data Values for Second Pass Method
Components
2
1
, MTTF (hrs) Failure Variance
Source MTTF(hrs) Failures Variance
90%
+I1029
35 NIA
26178
15
35000
1
26500
50 NIA
27000
25 95% +I- 2565
2
29560
1 50
1200
1 7 NIA
31 000
29800
18 N/A
198
1 500
32000
31500 1 50 NIA
5
26000
60 NIA
7
40 NIA
26700
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failure rate, the failure rates can be converted into MTTFs easily. Variances given as
confidence intervals will be transformed into worst-case variances using Chebychev's
equation. Source 1 for component 1 would be calculated as follows:
Ptx - µl·� ka} = 0.9 s -;k
l .05a = l029

⇒

⇒

k s l .05

1029
a = -- = 980
1 .05

The mean for component 1 would be calculated as
. L n; *MITE';

1 5 * 26 1 78 + 25 * 27000 + 1 50 * 3 1000 + 298 * 22000
µ1 -- -'=-•---= -----------------N
1 5 + 25 + 150 + 298

L ni
i=I

= 1 5253 670 = 3 1 257.05
488

4.2.1 Simulation

From table 5, source 1 for component 1 is responsible for 15 ofthe 488 failures,
or 0.03 07. For all instances where the ,source identifier for component 1 is below .�307,
the MTTF used will be 26 1 78 ± 980*X, wher� X i� a lognormally distributed random
variable with a mean of0 ·and a variance of 1. The second source would be chosen when
the source identifier falls between 0.03 07 and � + 0.0307 = 0.08 1 9 . When source 1
488

for component 1 is selected, the value for the MTTF will be taken as

- )* 980

M1TF = 26 1 78 + (e x e 0.s

for x uniformly distributed over the range [0, 1 ], and e0·5 represents the mean ofthe
lognormal distribution given by x. [8]
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Each iteration chooses a source identifier and a subsequent MTTF for each
component. This MTTF is used to generate a value for component reliability. The
MTTF is also compared to the mean to establish a variance for each component's MTTF.
The component's reliabilities are used to calculate the system reliability. The system
reliability is then compared to the lower limit. At the end of the simulation, the total
number of incidents where the system reliability was below 0.915 is tabulated and
divided by the total number of iterations. The same is done for the variances. Since the
predictions for components 31 and 32 were left as is from the First Phase, the values for
the MTTF for components 31 and 32 were again taken from the Beta distribution.
After 100,000 iterations, the probability that the system reliability was below the
lower limit was 23. 79%. This value is below the minimum set for the prediction;
therefore, the Third Phase method must be employed for at least one of the components.
The calculation of the system reliability using the means of the MTTFs yields a reliability
of .9109.
4.2.2 Sensitivity Analysis
Performing the sensitivity analysis as done in step 4. 1.2, the predictions for
components 32 (101900) and 1 (90650) have the most effect on the system reliability
prediction uncertainty, while components 31 (84990) and 2 (85260) have the least. Since
the prediction from component 32 was pulled in from step 4.1, some improvement might
be expected using Second Phase analysis, so it will be re-predicted. The historical data
for the component 32 is found in Table 6. Repeating the same procedure as earlier, but
substituting in the new values for component 32 yields 0=0.9135, which is below the set
limit. The majority of the variance comes from component 1 (92362), while components
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Table 6: Historical Data Values for
C omponent 32
Source MTTF(hrs) Failures Variance
3400
29500
100
1
9000
50
20500
2

2 (863 1 80) and 3 1 (84988) are also significant. Component 32 (25607) contributes the
least variance. Since the data for component 2 was compiled from 7 sources, there is a
lower chance that the tests required in the Third Phase would provide much
improvement. Therefore, only component 1 will be analyzed in the Third Phase.
4.3 Third Phase Analysis

10 components oftype 1 were tested for 4 failures each, with the resulting data in
Table 7. The mean and variance are calculated as 3227 1.58 and 2564.662, respectively.
The data produces a curve in the shape a lognormal distribution.
4.3.1 Simulation
The simulation methods for the components not re-analyzed in the Third Phase
remain the same. For component 1, the test data resulted in a lognormally distributed
curve with a mean and a variance. This distribution was used to generate data points for

1

Table 7 Resu ts ofTestmg
. tior Component 1
4
2
5
6
3
7

9

10

Pump
No.
TTF
(hrs)
TTF

30500 298 10 3 1227 3 1 526 30003 34462 34453 3097 1 3 1607 3 13 13

tTF

3 1 540 2992 1 3259 1 37133 37 133 33064 34783 2983 1 2988 1 3 2 1 82

fl-,.. ,,\

(hrs)
TTF
(hrs)

8

3077 1 32626 30359 4283 8 3083 5 3 1207 33 885 3 1 1 1 8 30890 3 0 1 79

30532 325 1 7 329 1 7 34977 32454 3446 1 29977 3099i 32583 30809
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component 1. The data from the Second Phase was used for components 2 and 32, and
the original O-M-P estimate was used for component 3 1.
After 100,000 iterations, the probability that the system reliability is above the set
lower limit is 9 1 . 78%. The reliability based upon the mean values of the MTTFs was
.91 18.
4.4 Results

The system reliability was found to be above .91 5 with more than 9 1 .5%
confidence. Component 1 required O-M-P estimation, the use of historical data, and
testing. Components 2 and 32 required O-M-P estimation and the use of historical data.
The O-M-P estimate for component 32 was left as is throughout the entire analysis. Four
types of components were predicted using 6 different prediction trials. The only
resource-consuming test performed was justified by the uncertainty resulting in the use of
the data sources.
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Chapter V
Condusions and Recommendations
5.0 Comparison to Other Methods
Referring to the sample analysis, the methodology presented herein will now be
compared to the methods described in Chapter 2. Table 8 summarizes the points made in
the comparison.
5.0.1 Comparison to Military Standards
DEF STAN 00-4 1/3 would have recommended that similar equipment methods
were used whenever possible. For any components not subject to the similar equipment
method, tests and trials would have been used. Only if this was impossible would the
generic parts count method be used. If the estimation from the generic parts count
method were in fact precise enough to meet the system reliability goals, then resources
required for tests and trials would have been expended unnecessarily. Since DEF STAN
00-4 1/3 does not provide a method _to evaluate the uncertainty of the prediction, this

would not have been known.
l\fIL-HDBK-756B would have required the use of certain data sources, or
if those data· sources were not sufficient, the use of the generic parts count method. For

DEF STAN 0041/3
MIL-SlD-756B
RPPI
Surulation

Table 8: Sunmuy ofAll Organizational Methods
Uncertainty Analysis Reduc.es Resources Identifies Techniques
N

N

N
y
N
N

N
N
y
y

�ogy Develqled y

y
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Y

Y
N
N

y

reliability without any indication as to the uncertainty associated with that prediction.
both methods, the resulting predictions would have given a value for the system
5.0.2 Comparison to RPPI and SRCI
RPPI would help divide the components into two groups, the first of which would
be subject to the majority of the analysis. The calculation of the RPPI is only based upon
the number of failures and the MTTFs of the data sources, and do not take into account
the variances in each of the sources. The RPPI would not recommend prediction
methods to use� although it would be obvious that the more resource consuming
prediction methods would be used for the components in group one. Additionally, there
are the four e?'ceptions described in chapter-2 that bypass the values of the RPPI to be
placed automatically in group one. If the engineer were not averse to the computational
complexity of the RPPI, the resulting information would be merely a separation of the
components into two groups for analysis.
The use of SRCI would be impossible for this model because of the presence of
standby, rather than active redundancy. If, in fact, the system analyzed were in an active
redundancy configuration, then the resulting confidence limits could have been obtained
through statistical analysis. Although this approach .is a useful evaluation tool in certain
cases, the simple system given in Chapter 4 could not have been analyzed using this
method.
Both of these methods require more strenuous calculation on the part of the user,
and neither takes into account the quality of the data used. The methodology developed
here requires less strenuous calculation, takes into account the quality of the data used,
and provides an iterative method which identifies methods to procure the data.
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5.0.3 Comparison to Simulation Methods
Both simulation methods required that the component reliability be given by a
single time to failure function. The model from Orman et al. uses the minimum,
maximum, and most likely approach with a triangul� distribution. [12] Given that for
mechanical components, the anticipated time to failure function is given by a Weibull
distribution, the probability of error is high. The resulting anticipated system reliability
and confidence intervals convey the same information as provided by the methodology
developed here. The model proposed by Gedam allows for the use of multiple
distributions (including the exponential, Weibull, and lognormal), and provides the
syste� reliability and confidence intervals as well. [9]
Both of these models were designed as evaluation tools. They provide no
information regarding the source of the data entered, and no recommendation for dealing
with unsatisfactory results. As discussed earlier, the derivation of time to failure
distribution from the MTTF and it's confidence intervals is difficult, if not impossible for
multiple sources of information.
5.1 Conclusions
A methodology has been presented by which an engineer can more efficiently
estimate the reliability of the system by identifying the components whose predictions
require the largest expenditure of resources. As seen in the analysis, the statistical
manipulation required to use this methodology is minimal. A knowledge of Monte Carlo
simulation is required, but the simulation itself is relatively simple. The greatest
computational challenge facing the user is the curve fitting in the Third Phase. Most
statistical analysis software, some simulation packages and many spreadsheets perform
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this task quickly and often guide their users to identify the correct curve to fit based upon
the given data.
5.2 Limitations

The methodology developed will only apply to those components where some
degree of historical data is available. For a completely revolutionary component, or in a
situation where there is no access to data, the methodology has no basis to begin.
Ad_ditionally, when the distribution of the data is unknown, the only alternative given is
the approximation of a beta distribution using the O-M-P method. There is no manner by
which to account for modes of failure, and for repairable systems, there is no
consideration given to the significance of availability.
The simulation used in the methodology is only effective if the system reliability
can be modeled as a function of the components' MTTF. In an interdependent system,
where failures cause changes in the reliability characteristics of other components, this is
not always the case.
5.3 Recommendations for Further Development

As mentioned, the methodology was developed without regard to multiple modes
of failure for components. The incorporation of modes of failure would have many
benefits. Recalling when certain sub-components failed may be easier than estimating
the failure rate for the entire component. Additionally, maintenance plans typically are
geared to affect one or two modes of failure, rather than every mode of failure for the
component. Estimating the effects would be more difficult without the ability to break up
the different modes of failure. Since some of the sources cited provide data for the
percentage of failures represented by each mode, those estimates can be included in the
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simulation. The estimates for the modes of failur.e can be developed using the iterative
methodology presented in Chapter 3 .
The estimates of mean time to repair (MTTR) are based upon the particular mode
of failure as well. While the only prediction made was MTTF, for repairable systems, the
availability is a more significant measure. Availability is a function ofMTTF and
MTTR. MTTR requires another estimation, one fraught with all of the difficulties of
MTTF prediction, but also one more dependant on the mode of failure. MTTR
estimations are given in some of the cited sources of pooled data, and can be developed
using the iterative methodology presented in Chapter 3.
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Appendix A.1
Reliability Background
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Moss and Strutt provide an adequate introduction to the basic concepts of reliability.
Using l to represent the equipment failure rate, the reliability, or probability that the
equipment will perform its intended function, over time period t is
R(t) = �-Al
From this, the probability of failure F in time t is defined as

F(t) = 1 - R(t) = 1 - e-.u
Bloch and Gietner relate the manner in .which these equations can be applied to
systems of equipment. Failure rate, l, is introduced as the expected number of failures
per time period. The mean time between failures, MTBF, is then the reciprocal of the
failure rate. The reliability, R(t), as a fu11:ction of time then becomes:
-t

R(t) = e -u = e MIBF
When multiple parts exist in a system, they can be in two configurations, parallel or
senes. For n parts in series, the reliability of the system, R., is defined an

For parts in parallel, several scenarios exist. A failure of one component may cause a
failure in the system. A failure in all components may be required to cause failure of a
system. Bloch and Geitner only deal with these two cases. A third case is possible. A
failure of a portion of the components may cause a failure in the system. This last case is
described as a k-out-of-n system. The first two cases can be viewed as special cases of
the k-out-of-n system. Applying the binary distribution, the reliability of a k-out-of-n
system can be represented as:
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R.

=

t (nxJ"

'"' (1 - R)""'

z=k

For the case when a single part failing causes the system to fail, this translates to:
R,

= R1 x R2 x • • • x R1t

For the case when every part must fail before the system fails [I]:
R.

= 1 - [(1 - R. XI - R2 )· · · (l - R,. )]

The afore-mentioned model for a k-out-of-n system applies only to non
interdependent components with active redundancy. Active redundancy exists when each
parallel component in the system is actively running at ·a11 times. Non-interdependent
systems only .exist where the failure of one component does not affect the reliability of
. the other components. This scenario is not as frequently seen in the realm of rotating
equipment. The more common scenario is standby redundancy, where a component
remains idle until it is needed to cover a failure of another component in the system. The
most efficient mathematical models for this type of configuration are developed as
Markov chains, and �ave been catalogued for a number of possible configurations. [ 1 0]
Appendix A.2 provides a short discussion of the use of the Markov chain method in
reliability prediction and some sample values for commonly encountered configurations.
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Appendix A.2
Summaries of Data Sources
Provided by the Institute of Mechanical Engineers [5]
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Data Source:

1 CCPS

Full Name:

Guidelinesfor Process Equipment Reliability with data tables
prepared by the Equipment Reliability Subcommittee of the
Centre for Chemical Process Safety and Science Applications
International Corporation

Published by:

American Institute of Chemical Engineers

Type ofSource:

Book

Date ofpublication:

1 990

Type ofcomponents:

A wide range of chemical process equipment

No. of component 'types:

76 process equipment type

Type ofinformation:

Failure rates based on both calendar and operating time.
Failures of demand are also included where appropriate.

Source ofdata:

Data sources include plant specific data and general data.
Plant specific data reflects plant process, environment, and
maintenance practices. Generic data was collated from a
variety of sources. All major published sources of available
generic equipment reliability and failure rate data were used,
including reliability studies, published research works,
reliability data banks, government reports containing
information gathered from chemical process, nuclear, offshore oil, and fossil fuel industries around the world.

,.

Type ofdata:

:

The data are characterized as equipment failures per I 06
operating hours for time-related failure rates and failures per
I 03 demands for demand related failure rates. Rates are given
for common chemical process equipment. Equipment used
for transport of chemicals are not covered. The cause of
equipment failures, the means to improve reliability and the
'most' reliable equipment are not addressed.
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I

Data Source:

3 DEF STAN 00-41 pt 3

Full Name:

MoD Practices and Proceduresfor Reliability and
Maintainability, Part 3: Reliability Prediction, Report No. 004 1 (Part 3)/Issue 1 (Issue 2 does not contain this data.)

Published by:

Ministry of Defence

Type ofSource:

Standard

Date ofpublication:

December 1983

Type of components:

Equipment covered in Table 5 (mechanical components)
include a variety of static and rotating devices, instruments
and connectors. A range of valve types are covered.
Equipment covered in Table 6 is limited to accelerometers,
actuators, aerials, circuit breakers, counters, gyroscopes,
timers, transducers, solenoids and a few miscellaneous items.

No. of component types:

95 mechanical components and 28 electro-mechanical
components

Type of information:

Table 5 of this reference contains mechanical components
failure rates and Table 6 provides electro-mechanical failure
rates. Table 8 contains reliabilities of one-shot items, which
may be of some interest to the mechanical engineer.

Source ofdata:

Reference sources for individual failure rates are not
provided.

Type of data:

For each component, a basic failure rate per million hours in
not provided, this being considered representative of a
'ground fixed' operating regime. Environmental factors are
then listed for 'ground mobile', ' ship protected', 'ship
exposed', 'air protected', and 'air exposed' operating regimes.
The user is intended to select the factor most closely reflecting
his component environment and multiply it by the base failure
rate. It is important to note that not all environmental factors
are provided for all components.
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I

Data Source:

5 Dexter and Perkins DP-1633

Full Name:

Component Failure Rate Data with Potential Applicability to
a Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Plant. Report No. DP- 1633 by
AH. Dexter and W.C. Perkins

Published by:

El Du Pont de Nemours and Company

Type ofSource:

Report

Date ofpublication:

July 1982

Type ofcomponents:

A wide variety of static, rotating and reciprocating devices,
b9th electrical and mechanical in nature and having passive,
process or safety function. Instrumentation used in nuclear
installations receives good coverage.

Type of information:

This document contains an extensive collection of component
failure rate data compiled from published literature and a
number of computer databases. There are 136 subject
categories containing over 1200 individual data points, with
special emphasis on components having application in the
nuclear fuel reprocessing industry.

Source of data:

Literature source of the data comprised reliability and safety
analysis journals published during the period 1970- 1980, plus
a number of non-journal source. Computer databases
searched were the ORNL Energy Data Base and Nuclear
Science Abstracts Data Base, and the DIA-LOG Compendex,
Inspec, Ismec and Scisearch databases.

Type of data:

Data is presented as an alphabetical list giving failure rates per
hour with upper and lower bound points where these are
available. A referen�e number is provided for each
component failure rate enabling the user to identify the source
via a standard list of references at the end of the document. A
few data points are presented in terms of failure rate per
demand or per cycle. In a very few cases an indication of the
operating environment of the components can be deduced, for
example, 'heavy duty', or 'light duty'.
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Data Source:

6 EIREDA

Full Name:

European Industry Reliability Data Handbook Vol. 1 - Electrical
Power Plants

Published by:

EUROPSTS, 38 rue Sedaine, 750 1 1
Paris, France

Type ofSource:

Data collected at 50 French nuclear power plants between 1978 and
1988

Date ofpublication:

October 1 99 1

Type of components:

Mechanical components (pumps, valves, tanks, heat exchangers,
filters, compressors, auxiliary turbines, etc), electrical components
(batteries, circuit breakers, transformers, motors and generators,
power distribution etc) and instrumentation and control equipment.

No. of component types:

92

Type of information:

A double page spread is devoted to each component type. The first
page details engineering characteristics (type, r/min, power,
pressure, temperature, medium environment etc) and operational
characteristics (operating mode, running hours and/or demands per
year, maintenance policy and test frequency). It also has ·a coloured
photograph of the component. The second page contains a table of
failure rates (with error factors) for one or more failure modes
(critical failure modes only) and mean repair times. Background
information in each Table includes the number of
components/plants and number of plant/years, and a separate table
lists comparable failure rates drawn from other published sources
where available (mainly WASH1400, IEEE 599, RKS 85-25 and
American nuclear power station data.) Introductory sections define
the scope of the data book and discuss the choice of components,
boundaries and statistical methods used, and an appendix indicates
how the data could be applied to other industries.

Type of data:

Mainly pooled data from similar designs of power stations. Only
critical failures have been selected, i.e. complete loss of function of
the component. Voluntary shut-down of a component to avoid
severe degredation is not necessarily considered to be a critical
failure. Expert judgment has been used to components with sparse
data.
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Data Source:

7 ENI

Full Name:

ENI Reliability Data Bank - Component Reliability
Handbook, by G. Galvanin, V. Colonibari, and C. Bello

Published by:

Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi (ENI)

Type of Source:

Book

Date ofpublication:

October 1982

Type of components:

Valves, pumps, motors, generators, turbines, transformers,
switch-gear, relays, controllers, switches, thermocouples,
transmitters, detectors, annunciators� cables, compressors,
bursting disks, etc.

No. of component 'types:

30

Type of information:

Handbook summarizing the contents of the ENI Data Bank
and giving component and equipment failure rates in
convenient form.

Source of data:

Statistical processing of even reports from various sites within
ENI Group during the periods 1978-1982. Since ENI is the
national industry responsible for hydrocarbon development
within Italy, it is likely that much of the data originates from
offshore installations and petrochemical process facilities .
The total sample size was about 6000 items.

Type of data:

All failure rates are expressed as failures per year; there are no
failure on demand rates . Sample sizes, numbers of events,
and operational experience in years are provided. Failure
modes are expressed as occurrence rates for events
categorized as major failures (loss of function), minor failures
(reduced performance) or leakage . Mean times to restore to
service are provided, expressed in hours.
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Data Source:

8 Greene and Bourne

Full Name:

AE. Green and AJ. Bourne Reliability Technology

Published by:

Wiley-Interscience

Type ofSource:

Book

Date ofpublication:

1972

Type ofcomponents:

The tables cover mainly electronic components with some
mechanical components

Type of information:

The book outlines the theory and application of reliability
technology to the evaluation and validation of the reliability
of industrial systems. A range of reliability data is presented
in tabular form in appendix A

Source ofdata:

The data has no referenced source.

Type ofdata:

Table A 7 lists average failure rates (f710°) for electronic and
mechanical components. Table A.8 provides stress level
factors for use in parts count analyses for the overall
environment, rating and temperature.
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I

9 IAEA-TECDOC

Data Source:
Full Name:

International Atomic Energy Agency

Published by:

International Atomic Energy Agency

Type of Source:

Database

Date ofpublication:

1989

Type of components:

Mechanical components, electrical components,
instrumentation and control, (I&C) equipment and emergency
power sources.

No. of component types:

430

Type of information:

Failure rates and probabilities for modes of failure and
environments

Source of data:

The IAEA Data Base V-ersion 1.0 consists of about 1000
records compiled from 21 different data sources and include ·
all data from nuclear power plant components usually
modeled in PS As (probabilistic safety assessment).

Type ofdata:

The IAEA Data Base contains about 1000 records. More than
430 different components are addressed, having an average
2.2 failure modes.

Note:

The database will run on IBM compatible personal computers.
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Data Source:

10 IEEE 500

Full Name:

IEEE Guide to the collection andpresentation of electrical,
electronic, sensing component and mechanical equipment
Reliability data/or Nuclear Power Generating Stations. Std
500-1 984

Published by:

The Institution of Electrical and Electronic Engineers

Type ofSource:

Book

Date ofpublication:

1983

Type of components:

A wide range of mechanical and electro-meqhanical
components plus instrumentation and some light electrical
components. Components are divided according to function
into seventeen chapters, each with a hierarchical structure.
There is no alphabetical index of components.

No. of component types:

Approximately 1200

Type of information:

Data is presented in the form of a hardback standard
comprising 1424 pages. Each component is presented on a
standards format Which locates it in its hierarchy and fives,
where available, failures per 1 06 hours, failures per 1 0 cycles
and out of service time (or repair and restoration time). If
several sources are combined on one data sheet, the highest
and lowest values are also given. Rates are given for different
failure modes where possible and a reference to the source of
data is given. Composite component data sheets are created
by combining data from lower down the hierarchical
structure, where meaningful.

Source ofdata:

Data relates mainly to American nuclear power station
experience but some American general industrial and military
sources. A structured expert judgment method had been used
to fill gaps in the collected data.

Type ofdata:

Some specific, some pooled. Size and application information
is given for some components. Little environmental
information is given but tables of environmental factor
multipliers are given for electrical components.
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Data Source:

1 1 LEES

Full Name:

Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, F.P. Lees

Published by:

Buttersworth, London

Type ofSource:

Book (2 Volumes)

Date ofpublication:

1 980

Type of components:

The appendices in Volume 2 contain a wide range ofdata on
process plant components,- mechanical and ele_ctrical items;
and a failure and event database used in the 1 978 HSE
Canvey study. Volume 1 contains a human error database and
reference is made to common cause failures.

Type of information:

The books give detailed models and methodologies for
extensive application ofloss prevention and risk analysis. A
wide range ofreliability data is g�ven including an extensive
reference list.

Source of data:

The main sources ofreliability data are UKAEA, USAEC and
Green and Bourne (q.v.), however, many other sources are
used including the autho_r's own work which is listed in the
references. Lees et al., then Lees published a series ofjournal
articles in the early 1 970s on the reliability and failure modes
ofinstruments in the chemical plant environment. These were
followed by a more extensive article which also included
maintenance man-hours and a paper adding nuclear data was
presented at the IchemE. Symposium 47.

Type of data:

Data is presented in a series oftables according to generic
type with the source reference. Failure rates, in some cases
broken down into failure modes, event rates, human error
pr�babilities and outage data are given.

71

Data Source:

12 MIL-HDBK-2 17F

Full Name:

Military Handbook - Reliability Prediction ofElectronic
Equipment - Issue F

Published by:

US Department of Defense

Type ofSource:

Report

Date ofpublication:

December 1991

Type ofcomponents:

The reference pertains principally to electronic/electrical
small devices, e.g., semiconductors, wave tubes, resistors,
capacitors, inductors, relays, switches, connectors, meters,
lamps, filters, fuses. However, it also contains data for some
electromechanical rotating devices, e.g., motors.

No. of comp<ment types:

19 but man� sub-classes

Type of information:

The handbook contains two methods of reliability prediction Parts Stress Analysis and Parts Count Analysis. The former
method is of interest from a data source point of view (see
type of data section below). The latter is used mainly in the
conceptual design phase

Source of data:

The source of data is unspecified, although the report states
'the failure rates and their associated adjustment factors
presented herein are based upon evaluation and analysis of the
best available data at the time of issue' .

. .

. Type ofdata:

Each device is assigned a base failure rate, expressed in
failures per million hours, which is then multiplied by a series
of environmental factors chosen according to the
manufacturing method, quality level and duty, to give a
corrected rate for the selected application. There are no
failure on demand rates.

Note:

Although this document is now in the public domain, it was
initially produced for military use. Many software packages
are available to carry out prediction to MIL HDBK 217.
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Data Source:

13 NPRD-91

Availablefrom:

Reliability Analysis Center, PO Box 4700, Rome, New York,
1344 1 -8200

Type ofSource:

Report and database

Date ofpublication:

199 1

Type of components:

General engineering components approximately 5 0 per cent
are mechanical including hydraulic and pneumatic
components. The remainder are divided between electromechanical, instrumentation and light electrical components.

No. of component types:

1400

Type of information:

The data has been collected by the Reliability Analysis Center
as an unclassified report. Data for each component type is
separated, where possible into different operating
environments. For each entry, the number of data sets is
given, with the number of failures and operating hours. From
these are derived point failure rate estimates together with 80
per cent upper level and 20 per cent lower level values if
failures occurred and 60 per cent upper levels if no failures
occurred. Corresponding MTBF s are printed in a separate
table. Another section of the report tables failures mode
distributions for the component types. Some of the
information is presented graphically. The data is also
available on a PC-accessible floppy disk.

Source of data:

The course of the reliability data is n_ot specified in detail, but
is predominantly from American military sources with
substantial input from commerciaVindustrial sources. Sources
are labeled M(military) of C(commercial)

Type ofdata:

Data is generic and pooled where appropriate. No
information is given about size or application although the
environment is stated.
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Data Source:

14 OREDA 84

Full Name:

Offshore Reliability Data Handbook (1st Edition)

Published by:

PennWell Publishing Company on behalfofthe OREDA
participating companies

Type ofSource:

Book

Date ofpublication:

1984

Type of components:

Covers only equipment used in the offshore oil and gas
industry and includes safety systems, e.g., firefighting and
ESD systems, process equipment, e.g., pumps, compressors,
valves, power generation, drilling, and lifting equipment.

No. of component types:

Around 170 different offshore components are covered

Type of information:

It has the advantage that environmental factors normally
associated with the relatively severe operating conditions do
not need to be considered.

Source of data:

The data was collected from a group ofeight participating
companies operating installations in the North Sea and the
Adriatic Sea during the period 1983- 1 984.

Type ofdata:

Data is presented in tabular form grouped by taxonomy,
giving the total population ofitems and the number of
different data sources (samples) for each component type.
Calendar and operationat· times are provided and also the
numbers ofdemands for non-rotating mechanisms such as
valves. Failure modes are categorized as critical (total loss of
function), degraded (partial loss offunction), incipient
(function not immediately lost but likely future impairment of
performance), or unknown. The numbers ofrecorded failures
under each category are given. Failure rates are expressed in
failures per million hours; lower and upper bounds as well as
mean rates are listed where available. In some cases repair
data is provided in terms ofactive repair time and repair manhours. System boundary diagrams are listed for each
component.
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'

Data Source:

15 OREDA 92

Full Name:

Offshore Reliability Data Handbook (2nd edition)

Published by:

The Oreda participants and distributed by DnV Technica.

Type ofSource:

Book

Date ofpublicf:!tion:

1992

Type of components:

Covers equipment used in the offshore oil and gas industry
and includes; process systems, safety systems, electrical
equipment, utility systems, crane systems and drilling
equipment.

Type of information:

For each item covered, the quantitative generic information
consists of: Failure modes, failures rates for each failure
mode, repair, e.g., active repair time given in man hours,
supportive information. Qualitative information is also
included covering; item descriptions, offshore applications,
environmental and operational conditions, failure causes and
additional descriptions of failure modes, data sources and item
boundary specifications.

Source of data:

The data was collected from a group of ten participating
companies operating installations in the North Sea between
1983 and 1992.

Type ofdata:

Data is presented in tabular form grouped by taxonomy,
giving the total population of items and the number of
different data sources (samples) for each component type.
Format is similar to OREDA 84.
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Data Source:

16 RKS/SKI 85-25

Full Name:

Reliability data bookfor components in Swedish nuclear
power plants.

Published by:

RKS-Nuclear Safety Board of the Swedish Utilities, SKISwedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate.

Type ofSource:

Book

Date ofpublication:

1987

Type of compo�ents:

Pumps, valves, instruments, and electrical power equipment
such as circuit �reakers, transformers, standby generators.

No. of component 'types:

54

Type of information:

Data is reported in English in the form of a paperback book
and comprises 145 pages. One table is given to each
component type. It contains a table of failure rates for·one or
more failure modes and average repair times for each of eight
nuclear reactors. Background information in each table
includes the number of components, demands, and failures in
the sample. Most tables include a schematic diagram of the
component and its related services and control equipment to
define the component boundaries. Introductory chapters
define the scope of the data book and discuss the choice of
components, boundaries, and statistical methods.

Source of data:

Data collected at four Swedish nuclear power stations up to 3 1
December 1 982.

Type ofdata:

Some data is specific and some is pooled. Where data is
specific, size information is given. No environmental
information is given since all components are located in
power stations. Applications are not usually stated on the
tables, but a table is given all of the power station systems
from which data was drawn.
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Data Source:

17 Rothbart

Full Name:

H.A Rothbart, Mechanical Design and Systems Handbook.

Published by:

McGraw-Hill

Type ofSource:

Book

Date ofpublication:

1964

Type of components:

Mainly general engineering, but includes approximately 20
per cent electronic and light electrical ·

No. of component types:

214

Type of information:

Information is tabulated in 1O pages in the book. A table of
mean failure rates plus upper and lower extreme values. An
additional table of generic life-expectancy distributions is
given for a similar number of items from a different source.
Mean life expectancy is a measure of life (in hours or cycles)
at which the wear out phase begins. Tables of severity factors
are given for each table to take account for different operating
conditions.

Source ofdata:

Data sources were not stated. However, they will probably
originate from American industry and may include some
aerospace data.

Type ofdata:

Data is generic. There is some subdivision into different
types but not into sizes or applications.
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Data Source:

18 Smith

Full Name:

r0
D.J. Smith, Reliability andMaintainability in Perspective (3
Edition)

Published by:

MacMillan, London

Type ofSource:

Book

Date ofpublication:

1 988

Type ofcomponents:

The data tables include electronic components, sensors and
mechanical components.

Type of information:

This book describes the reliability techniques to achieve
reliability and maintainability targets. It also covers the
meas,urement and prediction of reliability together with
various management topics. The third edition also includes a
chapter, chapter 22, which lists some of the common
reliability data sources and provides a useful list of failure
rates for engineering and microelectronic components
together with data on human error rates and fatality rates for
various activities.

Source of data:

Unkown

Type ofdata:

Table 1
Table 2
Table 3
Table 4
Table 5

General Failure Rates
Microelectronic failure rates
Fatality rates
Human error rate
Percentage failure modes

The majority of the failure rates in Table I are quoted as
ranges rather than point estimates of failure rate.
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Data Source:

20 Wash 1400

Full Name:

Reactor Safety Study. An Assessment ofAccident Risks in US
Commercial Nuclear Power Plants.

Type ofSource:

Multi-volume report. Reliability data mainly confined to
Appendix III - Failure Data. Available on microfiche.

Date ofpublication:

1974

Type of components:

General mechanical and electrical, e.g., pumps, valves, pipes
and fittings, diesels, battery power supplies, instrumentation,
clutches, motors, relays, switches and circuit breakers, fuses
and wires, transformers, solid state devices.

No. of component types:

30

Type of information:

Tables of mean failure rate/I 06 hours or failures per demand
for principal failure modes, with upper and lower bounds and
comparison of nuclear and industrial data. Limited common
mode failure data.

Source ofdata:

Data collected in 17 American nuclear power plants during
1972 is compared with data from 29 published sources from,
e.g., American industry, NASA, and Air Force data.

Type ofdata:

Generic. Only valves and switched are separated into
different types.

Note:

The data and associated material assembled in the report
incorporate ranges of error bands. These have sufficient
accuracy, detail, and resolution to satisfy the original
requirements of the study. However, the data may not be
sufficiently detailed, general, or accurate enough for use in
other quantitative reliability models or in applications
involving greater specificity.
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Data Source:

2 1 RMC Harris

Full Name:

Hazards and Reliability Information System

Published by:

RM Consultants Ltd, Abingdon, England, OX14 lDY, 023?
555155

Type ofSource:

Database, data sheets

Date ofpublication:

1992

Type of components:

Mechanical, electrical, rotating machinery, instrumentation,
process, safety, offshore oil and gas, nuclear, petrochemical.

No. of component types: · 600+ component types, 1700+ reliability data entries.
Type of information:

Data sheet presented on screen, basic failure statistics plus
additional information on operating environment. Also
maintainability and hazardous incident databases available.

Source of data:

Data from public domain sources and field failure studies.

Type ofdata:

Mean failure rate, operating experience, total number of
failures, percentage failure modes.
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Data Source:

22 SRD Data Centre

Full Name:

SRD Data Centre consists of a Technical Information Data
Library and a Computerised Databank

Published by:

Access via Data Products Manager or SRD Association
Manager

Type· ofSource:

Technical Data Library: books, reports, conference papers,
etc.
Computerised Databank: field collected event data.

Date ofpublication:

Ongoing data availability

Type ofcomponents:

Over 3 00 component classifications across general industry,
i.e., process, petrochemical, transport, defence, electricity
supply, water, manufacturing, computing, etc.

No. of component 'types:

Over 200 component classifications from Actuators to
Windscreen wipers

Type of information: .

Technical Information Library: public domain literature and
reports.
Databank: field collected event data processed into
component populations.

Source of data:

Field collected event data obtained as a result of collaborative
data collection campaigns with customer organisations.

Type ofdata:

Component Reliability Data: operational and calendar failure
rates, failure modes and causes, environmental factors,
operating regime, maintenance and testing regime, even
history information, availability, etc.
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Appendix A.3
MATLAB Code Used in Analysis
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% MATLAB Code for the Fi rst Phase
mttf = [ 3 4 0 0 0 2 4 0 0 0 1 8 00 0
3 6 0 0 0 1 9 0 0 0 12 0 0 0 0
32000 21000 14000 0
34500 27000 17500 0

0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0

0 0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0] ;

i =l ;
while i < 5
mttf ( i , 4 ) = ( 1/ 6 ) * (mttf ( i , 1 ) +4 *mttf ( i , 2 ) +mttf ( i , 3 ) ) ;
mtt f ( i , 5 ) = (mttf ( i , 4 ) -mttf ( i , 3 ) ) * ( 2 *mttf ( i , 2 ) -mttf ( i , l ) 
mtt f ( i , 3 ) ) / ( (mttf ( i , 2 ) -mttf ( i , 4 ) ) * (mttf ( i , l ) -mttf ( i , 3 ) ) ) ;
mtt f ( i , 6 ) =mtt f ( i , 5 ) * (mttf ( i , l ) -mttf (i , 4 ) ) / (mttf ( i , 4 ) -mttf ( i , 3 ) ) ;
mtt f ( i , 7 ) =beta (mttf ( i , 5 ) , mttf ( i , 6 ) ) ;
mtt f ( i , 8 ) = ( (mttf ( i , l ) -mttf ( i , 3 ) ) / 3 . 2 ) A 2 ;
i = i+l ;
end
fid= fopen ( ' BETAONE ' ) ;
mult= [ l 1 3 / 12 1 l ] ;
countOneLow=0 ;
j =l ;
while j <l 0 0 l
i=l ;
while i < 5
BETAONE ;
MTTF ( i , 2 ) =mttf ( i , 3 ) + (mttf ( i , l ) -mtt f ( i , 3 ) ) *X ;
MTTF ( i , 3 ) = exp ( - 1 0 0 0/ (mult ( i ) *MTTF ( i , 2 ) ) ) ;
i = i+l ;
end
l aml = l/MTTF ( 3 , 2 ) ;
lam2=1/MTTF ( 4 , 2 ) ;
MTTF ( 3 , 3 ) = exp ( 1 0 0 0/ ( ( laml A 2+lam2 A 2 +laml*lam2 ) / ( laml A 2 * lam2 +laml*lam2 A 2 ) ) ) ;
Rsys ( j ) =MTTF ( l , 3 ) *MTTF ( 2 , 3 ) *MTTF ( 3 , 3 ) ;
i f Rsys ( j ) < 0 . 915
countOneLow=countOneLow+l ;
end
j = j +l ;
end
laml=l/mttf ( 3 , 4 ) ;
lam2=1/mttf ( 4 , 4 ) ;
Rthree = exp ( 1 0 0 0 / ( ( laml A 2+lam2 A 2 +laml*lam2 ) / ( laml A 2 * lam2+laml *lam2 A 2 ) ) ) ;
RmeanOne = exp ( - 1 0 0 0/mttf ( l , 4 ) ) *exp ( - 1 0 0 0 /mttf ( 2 , 4 ) ) *Rthree;
probOneLow=countOneLow/ ( j - 1 ) ;
fprint f ( ' \nProbability too low % 1 . 4 f\n ' , probOneLow)
fprintf ( ' \n Variances % 7 . 2 f %7 . 2 f %7 . 2 f %7 . 2 f
\n ' , mttf ( l , 8 ) /max (mttf ( : , 8 ) ) , mttf ( 2 , 8 ) /max (mttf ( : , 8 ) ) , mttf ( 3 , 8 ) /ma
x (mtt f ( : , 8 ) ) , mttf ( 4 , 8 ) /max (mtt f ( : , 8 ) ) )
varblurb=mttf ( : , 8 ) ;
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%

MATLAB Code for the Second Pha s e , Fi rst Attempt

mttf2= [ 35 3 5 0 0 0 0
50
2 65 0 0
0
17
2 9560
0
18
29800
0
1 5 0 3 15 0 0
0
60
26000
0
40
2 67 0 0
0] ;
mttf1= [ 15 2 6 178
25
27 0 0 0
150 31000
298 32000

980
2500
12 0 0
1500

];

sum2=sum (mttf2 ( : , 1 ) ) ;
i=l ;
mean2 = 0 ;
while i < 8
mean2=mttf2 ( i , l ) *mttf2 ( i , 2 ) +mean2 ;
i=i+ l ;
end
mean2=mean2 /sum2 ;
s urnme r= 0 ;
var2 1=0 ;
i=l ;
while i < 8
summer=mttf2 ( i , l ) +surnmer;
mttf2 ( i , l ) = surnmer;
var2 1=mttf2 ( i , l ) * (mtt f2 ( i , 2 ) ) A 2 ;
i =i+l ;
end
var2 form= ( var2 1/ ( swn2 A 2 ) ) A 0 . 5 ;
sum2 = sum (mttfl ( : , 1 ) ) ;
i=l ;
meanl = 0 ;
while i < 5
meanl=mttfl ( i , l ) *mttfl ( i , 2 ) +meanl ;
i=i+l ;
end
meanl=meanl / swn2 ;
mtt fl ( : , l ) =mttfl ( : , l ) / sum2 ;
s urnme r = 0 ;
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i=l ;
while i < 5
sumrner=mttfl ( i , l ) +summer ;
mttfl ( i , l ) =summer ;
i=i+l ;
end
countTwoLow=0 ;
j =l ;
var2=0 ;
varl=0 ;
var32=0 ;
while j < 1 0 0 1
i=3 ;
BETAONE;
MTTF ( 3 , 2 ) =mttf ( i , 3 ) + (mttf ( i , l ) -mtt f ( i , 3 ) ) *X ;
MTTF ( 3 , 3 ) =exp ( -1 0 0 0/MTTF ( i , 2 ) ) ;
i=:= 4 ;
BETAONE ;
MTTF ( 4 , 2 ) =mttf ( i , 3 ) + (mtt f ( i , l ) -mtt f ( i , 3 ) ) *X ;
MTTF ( 2 , 2 ) =mean2+ ( exp ( randn ) -exp ( 0+1 A 2 /2 ) ) �var2 fo rm;
MTTF ( 2 , 3 ) =exp ( - 1 0 0 0/ ( 13*MTTF ( 2 , 2 ) / 12 ) ) ;
var2=var2+ (MTTF ( 2 , 2 ) -mean2 ) A 2 ;
% fprint f ( ' %7 . 2 f\n ' , MTTF ( 2 , 2 ) )
i=4 ;
s ource ( 2 ) =4 ;
while i < 5
x2 l=rand;
if x2 l<mttfl ( i , l )
source ( 2 ) =i ;
MTTF ( l , 2 ) =mttfl ( s ource ( 2 ) , 2 ) + ( exp ( randn ) 
exp ( 0+1 A 2 /2 ) ) *mttfl ( s ource ( 2 ) , 3 ) ;
MTTF ( l , 3 ) =exp ( - 1 0 0 0/MTTF ( l , 2 ) ) ;
end
varl=varl+ (MTTF ( l , 2 ) -meanl ) A 2 ;
i=i+l ;
end
laml=l/MTTF ( 3 , 2 ) ;
lam2=1/MTT F ( 4 , 2 ) ;
MTTF ( 3 , 3 ) =exp ( 1 0 0 0/ ( ( laml A 2 +lam2 A 2+laml*lam2 ) / ( laml A 2 * lam2 +laml * lam2 A 2 ) ) ) ;
Rs ysTwo ( j ) =MTTF ( l , 3 ) *MTTF ( 2 , 3 ) *MTTF ( 3 , 3 ) ;
i f Rs ysTwo ( j ) <0 . 9 15
countTwoLow=countTwoLow+l ;
end

87

j =j +l ;
end
laml=l/mtt f ( 3 , 4 ) ;
lam2=1/mtt f ( 4 , 4 ) ;
Rthree=exp ( 1 0 00/ ( ( laml A 2+lam2 A 2+laml *lam2 ) / ( laml A 2*lam2+laml*lam2 A 2 ) ) ) ;
RmeanTwo=exp ( - 1 0 00/meanl ) * exp ( - 1 0 0 0/mean2 ) * Rthree
var2=var2 / ( j -2 ) ;
varl=varl/ ( j -2 ) ;
var3 l=mttf ( 3 , 8 ) ;
var32=mttf ( 4 , 8 ) ;
vars=max ( [ varl var2 varl va r32 ] ) ;
fprintf ( ' \n Vars % 7 . 3 f %7 . 3 f %7 . 3 f %7 . 3 f \n ' , varl , var2 , var31 , var32 )
fprintf ( ' Vars %7 . 3 f %7 . 3 f %7 . 3 f %7 . 3 f
\n ' , varl/vars , var2 /vars , var31/vars , var32/vars )
probTwoLow=countTwoLow/ ( j - 1 )
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%

MATLAB Code for the Second Phas e , Second Attempt

mtt f2 = [ 3 5 3 5 0 0 0 0
0
26500
50
0
29560
17
0
29800
18
150 31500
0
0
60
2 60 0 0
2 67 0 0
0] ;
40
mtt fl= [ l 5 2 6 1 7 8
25
27000
150 31000
2 9 8 32 0 0 0

980
2500 .
1200
1500 ] ;

mtt f32 = [ 1 00 2 9 5 0 0 3 4 0 0
50
30500
9000] ;
sum2 = sum (mttf2 ( : , l ) ) ;
i=l ;
mean� = O ;
while 1 < 8
mean2=mttf2 ( i , l ) *mttf2 ( 1 , 2 ) +mean2 ;
i = i+l ;
end
mean2=mean2 / sum2 ;
s ummer= O ;
va r2 1 = 0 ;
i =l ;
while i < 8
summer=mttf2 ( i , l ) +summe r ;
mtt f2 ( i , l ) = summer;
var2 l=mttf2 ( i , l ) * (mttf2 ( i , 2 ) ) � 2 ;
i=i+l ;
end
va r2 form= ( var2 1 / ( sum2 �2 ) ) � 0 . 5 ;
sum2 = sum (mttfl ( : , l ) ) ;
i= l ;
meanl = O ;
while i < 5
meanl=mttfl ( i , l ) *mttfl ( i , 2 ) +me anl ;
i = i+l ;
end
meanl=meanl/sum2 ;
mtt fl ( : , l ) =mttfl ( : , l ) / sum2 ;
summer = O ;
i=l ;
while i < 5
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s ummer=mtt fl ( i , l ) +summe r ;
mttfl ( i , l ) = s umme r ;
i = i+l ;
end
sum2 = sum (mttf32 ( : , 1 ) ) ;
i=l ;
mean32 = 0 ;
while i < 3
mean32=mttf32 ( i , l ) *mttf32 ( i , 2 ) +mean32 ;
i=i+l ;
end
mean32=mean3 2 / sum2 ;
mttf32 ( : , l ) =mttf32 ( : , 1 ) / s um2 ;
summer = 0 ;
i=l ;
while i < 3
summer=mttf32 (·i , 1 ) +summe r ;
mttf32 ( i , l ) = summe r ;
i = i+l ;
end
countTwoLow=0 ;
j =l ;
var2 = 0 ;
varl = 0 ;
var32 = 0 ;
while j < 1 0 0 1
i =4 ;
BETAONE ;
MTTF ( 4 , 2 ) =mttf ( i , 3 ) + (mttf ( i , i l ) -mttf ( i , 3 ) ) *X ;
MTTF ( 4 , 3 ) = exp ( - 1 0 0 0/MTTF ( i , 2 ) ) ;
MTTF ( 2 , 2 ) =mean2+ ( exp ( randn ) -exp ( 0+1 A 2/2 ) ) *var2 form;
MTTF ( 2 , 3 ) =exp ( - 1 0 0 0 / ( 1 3 *MTTF ( 2 , 2 ) / 12 ) ) ;

var2 =var2+ (MTTF ( 2 , 2 ) -mean2 ) A 2 ;
% fprint f ( ' % 7 . 2 f\n ' , MTTF ( 2 , 2 ) )

i=4 ;
s ource ( 2 ) =4 ;
while i < 5
x2 1 = rand; ,
if x2 1<mttfl ( i , 1 )
source ( 2 ) = i ;
MTTF ( l , 2 ) =mttfl ( s ource ( 2 ) , 2 ) + ( exp ( randn ) 
exp ( 0+1 A 2 /2 ) ) *mttfl ( source ( 2 ) , 3 ) ;
MTTF ( l , 3 ) = exp ( - 1 0 0 0/MTTF ( l , 2 ) ) ;
end
varl =varl+ (MTTF ( l , 2 ) -meanl ) A 2 ;
i =i+l ;
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end
i=l ; .
s ource ( 3 ) =2 ;
whil e i < 3
x32=rand;
i f x32<mttf32 ( i )
source ( 3 ) =i ;
MTTF ( 3 , 2 ) =mttf32 ( s ource ( 3 ) , 2 ) + ( exp ( randn ) 
exp ( 0+1 A 2 /2 ) ) *mtt f32 ( source ( 3 ) , 3 ) ;
MTTF ( 3 , 3 ) =exp ( -1 0 0 0/MTTF ( 3 , 2 ) ) ;
end
var32=var32 + (MTTF ( 3 , 2 ) -mean32 ) A 2 ;
i=i+l ;
end
laml=l /MTTF ( 3 , 2 ) ;
lam2=1 /MTTF ( 4 , 2 ) ;
MTTF ( 3 , 3 ) =exp ( -

1 0 0 0 / ( ( laml A 2 +lam2 A 2+laml *lam2 ) / ( laml A 2 *lam2+laml * l am2 A 2 ) ) ) ;

Rs ysTwo ( j ) =MTT F ( l , 3 ) *MTTF ( 2 , 3 ) *MTTF ( 3 , 3 ) ;

if RsysTwo ( j ) < 0 . 91 5
countTwoLow=countTwoLow+l ;
end
j =j +l ;

end
l aml=l/mtt f ( 3 , 4 ) ;

lam2=1/mtt f ( 4 , 4 ) ;

Rthree=exp ( 1 0 0 0 / ( ( laml A 2+lam2 A 2+1aml* lam2 ) / ( laml A 2 * lam2 +1 aml * l am2 A 2 ) ) ) ;
RmeanTwo=exp ( -1 0 0 0 /meanl ) *exp ( � l 0 00 /mean2 ) * Rthree
var2=var2/ ( j -2 ) ;
var l=varl/ ( j -2 ) ;
var3 l=mttf ( 3 , 8 ) ;
var32=var32/ ( j -2 ) ;
vars=max ( [ varl var2 var3 1 var32 ] ) ;
fprintf ( ' \n Vars %7 . 3 f % 7 . 3 f %7 . 3 f %7 . 3 f \n ' , varl , var2 , var3 1 , va r32 )
fprintf ( ' Vars % 7 . 3 f %7 . 3 f % 7 . 3 f % 7 . 3f
\ n ' , varl/vars , var2/vars , var31 /vars , va r32/vars )
probTwoLow=countTwoLow/ ( j -1 )
varblurb= [ varl va r2 var3 1 var32 ] ;
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%

MATLAB Code for the Thi rd Phas e

mttf2= [ 3 5 3 5 0 0 0 0
0
5 0 · 2 65 0 0
29560
17
0
18
29800
0
150 31500
0
60
26000
0
0] ;
2 67 0 0
40
mttfl= [ l 5 2 617 8
27000
25
150 31000
2 9 8 32 0 0 0

980
2500
12 0 0
1500

];

mttf32 = [ 1 0 0 2 9 5 0 0 7 0 0
50
30500
900] ;

sum2=sum ( m�tf2 ( : , l ) ) ;
i=l ;
mean2=0 ;
while i < 8
mean2=mttf2 ( i , l ) *mttf2 ( i , 2 ) +mean2 ;
i=i+l ;
end
mean2=mean2 /sum2 ;
summer = 0 ;
var2 1=0 ;
i=l ;
while i < 8
summer=mtt f2 ( i , l ) +summer ;
mtt f2 ( i , l ) = summer;
var2 l=mttf2 ( i , l ) * (mttf2 (i , 2 ) ) "2 ;
i=i + l ;
end
va r2 form= ( var2 1 / ( sum2 " 2 ) ) " 0 . 5 ;
sum2 = sum (mttf32 ( : , l ) ) ;
i=l ;
mean32=0 ;
while i < 3
mean32=mttf32 ( i , l ) *mttf32 ( i , 2 ) +mean32 ;
i=i+l ;
end
mean32=mean32/sum2 ;
mttf32 ( : , l ) =mttf32 ( : , l ) / sum2 ;
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summe r= 0 ;
i=l ;
whil e i < 3
summer=mttf32 ( i , l ) +summer ;
mttf32 ( i , l ) =summe r ;
i=i+l ;
end
countTwoLow=0 ;
j =l ;
var2=0 ;
varl=0 ;
var32=0 ;
whil e j < 1 0 0 1
i=4 ;
BETAONE ;
MTTF ( 4 , 2 ) =mttf ( i , 3 ) + (mtt f ( i , l ) -mttf ( i , 3 ) ) *X ;
MTTF ( 4 , 3 ) =exp ( -1 0 0 0/MTTF ( i , 2 ) ) ;
MTTF ( l , 2 ) =3227 1 . 7 6+ ( exp ( randn) -exp ( 0+1 A 2 /2 ) ) * 2 5 6 4 . 66 ;
MTTF ( l , 3 ) =exp ( -1 000/ ( 1 3*MTTF ( 2 , 2 ) / 12 ) ) ;
va r2=var2+ (MTTF ( 2 , 2 ) -32272 ) A 2 ;
MTTF ( l , 2 ) =mean2+ ( exp ( randn ) -exp ( 0+ 1 A 2 / 2 ) ) * var2 form;
MTTF ( l , 3 ) =exp ( - 1 0 0 0 / ( 1 3*MTTF ( 2 , 2 ) / 12 ) ) ;
var2=var2+ (MTTF ( 2 , 2 ) -mean2 ) A 2 ;
% fprint f ( ' % 7 . 2 f\n ' , MTTF ( 2 , 2 ) )
i=4 ;
source ( 2 ) =4 ;
while i < 5
x2 1 =rand;
i f x2 1<mttfl ( i , 1 )
s ource ( 2 ) =i ;
MTTF ( l , 2 ) =mttfl ( source ( 2 ) , 2 ) + ( exp ( randn ) 
exp ( 0+1 A 2 /2 ) ) *mttfl ( s ource ( 2 ) , 3 ) ;
MTTF ( l , 3 ) =exp ( -1 0 0 0 /MTTF ( l , 2 ) ) ;
end
var l=varl+ ( MTTF ( l , 2 ) -meanl ) A 2 ;
i=i+l ;
end
i=l ;
source ( 3 ) =2 ;
while i < 3
x32=rand;
i f x32<mttf32 ( i )
source ( 3 ) =i ;
MTTF ( 3 , 2 ) =mttf32 ( s ource ( 3 ) , 2 ) + ( exp ( randn ) 
exp ( 0+1 A 2 / 2 ) ) *mttf32 ( source ( 3 ) , 3 ) ;
MTTF ( 3 , 3 ) =exp ( -1 0 0 0/MTTF ( 3 , 2 ) ) ;
end
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var32 =var32+ (MTTF ( 3 , 2 ) -mean32 ) A 2 ;
i = i+l ;
end
laml = l/MTTF ( 3 , 2 ) ;

l am2 =1/MTTF ( 4 , 2 ) ;
MTTF ( 3 , 3 ) =exp ( -

1 0 0 0/ ( ( laml A 2+lam2 A 2+laml *lam2 ) / ( l aml A 2 * lam2+laml * lam2 A 2 ) ) ) ;

Rs ysTwo ( j ) =MTTF ( l , 3 ) *MTTF ( 2 , 3 ) *MTTF ( 3 , 3 ) ;

i f RsysTwo ( j ) <0 . 9 1 5
countThreeLow=countThreeLow+l ;
end
% fprint f ( ' % 7 . 3 f % 7 . 3 f %7 . 3 f
% 1 . 4 f\n ' , MTTF ( l , 3 ) , MTTF ( 2 , 3 ) , MTTF ( 3 , 3 ) ,· RsysTwo ( j ) )
j = j +l ;
end
laml = l /mtt f ( 3 , 4 ) ;
lam2 = 1/mttf ( 4 , 4 ) ;
Rthree=exp ( -

1 0 0 0 / ( ( laml A 2 +lam2 A 2 +laml *lam2 ) / ( l aml A 2 *lam2+laml *lam2 A 2 ) ) ) ;
:RmeanThree = exp ( -1 0 0 0 / 3227 2 ) * exp ( - 1 0 0 0 /mean2 ) *Rthree
var2 =var2 / ( j -2 ) ;
varl =varl/ ( j -2 ) ;
var31=mtt f ( 3 , B ) ; .
var32 =var32/ ( j -2 ) ;
vars=max ( [ varl var2 var31 var32 ] ) ;
fprint f ( ' \n Vars %7 . 3 f %7 . 3 f % 7 ..3 f %7 . 3 f \n ' , var l , var2 , var 3 1 , var32 )
fprint f ( ' Vars % 7 . 3 f % 7 . 3 f % 7 . 3 f % 7 . 3 f
\n ' , varl/vars , var2 / vars , var3 1 /vars , var32/vars )
probThreeLow=countThreeLow/ ( j - 1 )
varblurb = [ varl var2 var31 var32 ] ;
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%
%

MATLAB Code for generation o f Beta dis t ribution
Developed us ing algorithm provided by Fishman [ 9 ]

dl=min ( mttf ( i , 5 ) , mttf ( i , 6 ) ) ;
d2=max (mttf ( i , 5 ) , mtt f ( i , 6 ) ) ;
d3=dl+d2 ;
d4= ( ( d3-2 ) / ( 2 *dl * d2-d3 ) ) A Q . 5 ;
d5=dl+l/d4 ;
accept=O ;
whil e accept <l
U l=rand;
U2=rand;
V=d4*log ( (Ul/ ( l-Ul ) ) ) ;
W=exp (V) ;

Z l=Ul *Ul*U2 ;
R=d5 *V-log ( 4 ) ;
S=dl+R-W;
T=log ( Z l ) ;
i f S+l+log { S ) >=S * Z l
accept=l ;
elsei f S>=T
accept=l ;
erid
end
i f dl>mtt f ( i , 5 )
X=W/ ( d2+W ) ;
else
X=d2 / ( d2+W ) ;
end
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